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DIPLOMACY AND "THE G-WoRD"
Jerry Fowlert
Thank you very much and thanks to our host for organizing this
Symposium. It is a tremendous privilege to be here and to share the
program with so many people that I respect so much and who have been
involved in these issues for much longer than I have.
After hearing Madeline Morris' presentation, I do have to say that I
think there is a lot of overlap in the way we see things, but I would stop
short of her argument that genocide should be dispensed with altogether as
a separate category. 1 What I really want to focus on is the use of the word
"genocide" and the concept that I call "pre-justice stage." Michael was
talking about "justice" and "anti-justice, 2 but what I really want to talk
about is pre-justice - the time involving prevention of genocide or
responses to genocide. And I should just note what most of you probably
know: on this whole question of using the terminology and the advantages
of using the word genocide and trying to find appropriate alternatives,
David Scheffer, in his article in the Suffolk Transnational Law Review,
proposes the use of the term "atrocity crimes" as an alternative under
certain circumstances. 3  I think that his proposition is something that
deserves a lot of attention.
But I am actually going to make the argument that we should not
jettison altogether the concept of genocide in the pre-justice phase, the
response phase. Instead, we need to adopt an approach different from the
one adopted in the past. Also, I want to talk a little bit at the very end about
the way this concept has played into responses of the U.S. government to
the ongoing situation in Sudan. I think a lot of times in these discussions,
we, especially those of us who are lawyers, get focused on preventing the
last genocide. This is just like what they say about generals, "They're all
ready to fight the last war, but the next war is never quite like the last one."
But the next genocide or genocidal situation is not going to be exactly like
Rwanda or exactly like Bosnia, and we should not lose sight of that fact.
I B.A., Princeton University; J.D. Stanford Law School. Staff Director of Committee on
Conscience, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (1999-present); Legislative
Counsel, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1997-1999); Special Litigation Counsel,
U.S. Department of Justice (1993-1995); Officer, United States Army (1983-1987).
1 See Madeline Morris, The Role of Justice in Building Peace, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
205 (2003).
2 Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, The Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the
Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 161 (2003).
3 David J. Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 389,
410 (2002).
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I want to begin by emphasizing the distinction between prevention
and punishment. If you look at the UN Genocide Convention, you will see
that it is called the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.4 But then again, the whole text is really talking about
the punishment of genocide. It is very oblique on the question of
prevention, and, in fact, there is only one article that directly addresses that
question, and that article almost was not in the final version of the
Convention.5 At one point, it was dropped altogether. And then, if you
look at the text of it, what it says is that parties to the Convention may -
they do not have to, but they may - refer instances of genocide to
"competent organs of the United Nations."6  It is very, very weak
phraseology. One might conclude from looking at the Convention that
when it uses the term prevention, what it really means is that if we punish
genocide enough, that it will have a preventive effect, perhaps through
deterrence. As Michael pointed out, all of us may have an instinctive
feeling that eventually enough punishment will lead to deterrence, but there
is certainly no empirical evidence of that.7
As a general matter, there is acceptance today of a more expansive
view of prevention, that there really is some moral, if not legal, obligation
to do something to stop genocide before it happens. Or, once genocide is in
the making or once it does happen, there is an obligation that something
needs to be done to stop it, even if this obligation is more honored in the
breach. So, in spite of that fairly unpromising drafting history, this notion
of prevention is still very much an issue with which governments have to
deal.
But that leads us to a problem, and it is a problem that Madeline
Morris referred to more in a justice phase than in a pre-justice phase - the
problem of definitionalism. The definition of genocide in the UN
Convention is a legal definition, indeed a legalistic definition. 9 Now that
makes a lot of sense and is perfectly appropriate if you are trying to define a
crime for which some tribunal is going to assess guilt or innocence.
4 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention or UN Convention].
5 Id. at art. VIII.
61d.
7 Scharf, supra note 2, at 161.
8 See generally Morris, supra note 1, at 205.
9 Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. II (stating "[i]n the present Convention,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about it physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.").
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However, the question of prevention is not a legal question, the question of
prevention is a political question, and predicating political action on
satisfaction of a legal definition is a recipe for inaction. And I agree with
Michael Scharf's comments with regard to the actions of the United States
government in Bosnia and also in Rwanda to some extent. I think it is true
that it does not matter what definitions you are working with, if there is not
"political will" to respond, there is not going to be a response. ° And so, if
you have a Secretary of State who is being told one set of facts and asserts
in public testimony another set of facts, I do not know how you get around
that.
But on the other hand, relying on a legalistic definition does provide
the opportunity for endless debate about whether a situation is or is not
genocide. And while those debates are going on, the situation is getting
worse and people are dying. I think what we have to do is to find a way in
the pre-justice phase, in the prevention phase, to break out of that
definitionalism, to step away from the concern of whether something is
genocide or is not genocide, without totally losing the moral force of the
concept of genocide.
What we have done at the Holocaust Museum, where part of our
mandate is to alert the national conscience to contemporary genocide, is to
come up with a three-tier warning system: genocide watch, genocide
warning, and genocide emergency.' The first level, "genocide watch,"
describes a situation where there is a serious potential for genocide.'
2
"Genocide warning" is when organized violence is underway that threatens
to become genocide. 13 And a "genocide emergency" is when genocide is
occurring or is imminent.' 4  There is nothing particularly scientific or
precise about these levels; it is meant generally to describe a continuum
building towards indisputable genocide. In these three levels, we do not
have to wrestle with the question, "Is it or isn't it genocide?" We can say
the situation is in a range where, as David Scheffer said with regard to
Kosovo, "indicators of genocide" are present and for the pre-justice phase,
for the political phase, that should be enough to justify action. 5 We can let
a court later decide whether it actually was genocide in the legal sense, but
first we have laid a basis for political action.
1o See generally Scharf, supra note 2.
11 UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, About the Committee on Conscience,
at http://www.ushm.org/conscience/about.php#agenda (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
12 1d.
'
3 1d.
'
4 1d.
15 David Scheffer, Address at Case Western Reserve University School of Law War
Crimes Research Symposium (Feb. 28, 2003).
20031
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And we have applied this scheme, for example, with regard to Sudan.
The Holocaust Memorial Museum in October 2000 issued a genocide
warning for Sudan, meaning we believed there to be a threat of genocide
there. Now there are a lot of people concerned about Sudan who say it is
genocide, but there are also a lot of people concerned about Sudan, who say
that maybe it is not, maybe it does not meet the legal definition. But
resolving that dispute is not very conducive to focusing on what needs to be
done. So, what we are trying to do, as I said, is to set that question aside to
be dealt with later, to emphasize the moral stakes that are involved now, the
severity of the violence. And I think that a lot of people can agree that
there is a threat of genocide. For example, the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom issued a report and approached the
question in much the same way. 7 They were not willing to say it was
genocide, but they emphasized in the report that the values implicated by
the Genocide Convention are definitely under assault in Sudan.18
Not just because of our actions, but especially because of President
Bush's religious conservative constituencies who have been very involved
in Sudan, the United States government has put a lot of emphasis on
resolving the situation in Sudan. The Administration has adopted a policy
of very aggressive diplomacy which has achieved some results. There is
now a cessation of hostilities after eighteen years, which has dramatically
reduced the level of violence. There has been, at least for the last few
months, unimpeded humanitarian access. Before, one of the problems that
had been ongoing for a long, long time was interference with and
sometimes the cutoff of humanitarian access by the government of Sudan,
and the use of food as a weapon. So this progress has been made through
the use of aggressive U.S. diplomacy while advocates in the United States
were using some variant on the term genocide - some saying it was
genocide, others saying it was a threat of genocide. The Administration for
its purposes has not focused on that. That has been a little disconnected
from the diplomacy, which has allowed them to pursue the path that they
want to pursue.
Interestingly, at the end of last year the United States Congress passed
a piece of legislation called the Sudan Peace Act, which included a
congressional finding that the conduct of the Khartoum government
16 Press Release, Tom Cooney, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum , U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum's Committee On Conscience Praises Appointment of
Danforth As Sudan Envoy, (Sept. 6, 2001), at http://www.ushmm.com/
conscience/sudan/danfpr.php.
17 U.S. COMMISSION ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 35 (2000), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/01May00ReportIndex.php3 (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
'
81d.
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constituted genocide under the U.N. Genocide Convention. 9 President
Bush signed this piece of legislation. So, on one hand you have a statement
by the executive and legislative branches that genocide is happening in
Sudan, but then when you talk to the State Department, the people who are
actually conducting the policy, and ask whether this has affected their
approach or their diplomacy, the answer is, "No, not really. We're still
doing the same thing that we were. It is not an issue between us and
Khartoum, at least at this point."
So this presents something of a paradox. Speaking in terms of
genocide has helped focus a constituency in the United States on the
problem. It is also been a factor in the President's concern. And I should
emphasize that the effort that the Administration has put into this particular
issue has been driven by the President's concern. I remember hearing one
National Security Council official speak, not too long after President Bush
came into office. She said that one of the first directives she got was to
start working on Sudan. She responded, "Sudan? That's not ripe, we can't
deal with that." But it came from the very top, and that has driven what the
Administration has done.
So, invoking the concept of genocide has helped rivet attention, but on
the other hand, it has not necessarily defined the diplomacy. The
diplomacy has followed a separate track, which to this point appears to
have been constructive. What that tells me, though, is that "genocide," the
G-word, is still something that diplomats just cannot deal with. Lawyers
can deal with it, in the context of legal proceedings. Politicians can deal
with it, if there is a sufficiently strong constituency that is sufficiently
motivated to insist that a situation is genocidal. But the diplomats cannot.
The term describes conduct that is so extreme, so reprehensible, that
diplomats simply have to keep it out of their vocabulary if they are to carry
on with conventional diplomatic activity.
Finally, another question that is raised is if you look at the negotiations
that are being undertaken to resolve the situation in Sudan, which are
primarily between the government in Khartoum and the main rebel group,
which is the Sudan People's Liberation Army ("SPLA"), justice is not on
the table. They are talking about power sharing, they are talking about
wealth sharing, they are talking about security, they are talking about the
administration of certain marginalized areas. But justice is not on the table.
In part, that can be attributed to the fact that although Khartoum is
responsible for the vast majority of the abuses, and certainly the scope of
their abuses has been much greater, the SPLA itself does not have clean
hands and has been responsible for the deaths of many, many civilians in
the South - civilians who ostensibly are the people they represent. So, they
both have an interest in not putting justice on the table. And the question is,
19 Sudan Peace Act § 2(10), Pub. L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (codified as amended in
50 U.S.C. 1701)
2003]
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can you have a just peace, can you have an enduring resolution without
including justice as a part of that? And I think we will hear from Judge
Sofaer and Paul Williams on that issue in the next panel.20
20 Hon. Abraham Sofaer, Address at Case Western Reserve University School of Law
War Crimes Research Symposium (Feb. 28, 2003); Paul Williams, Address at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law War Crimes Research Symposium (Feb. 28, 2003). See
also Paul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role of Justice in the Former Yugoslavia:
Antidote or Placebofor Coercive Appeasement, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 219 (2003).
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